Diez años del Free and Open Indo-Pacific: la transformación de la estrategia regional japonesa
LEGAL REVIEW Cisneros Cristóbal, Paula. “Diez años del Free and Open Indo-Pacific: la transformación de la estrategia regional japonesa.” Boletín CODESEL, vol. 2, no. 10, August 2026, ISSN-e: 3045-7750. Review Over the last decade, the Indo-Pacific has moved from being a primarily geographic concept to becoming one of the central frameworks of contemporary strategic competition. For Japan, this transformation has been particularly significant. In this timely and well-structured article, Paula Cisneros Cristóbal analyses the evolution of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) from its initial formulation under Shinzo Abe in 2016 to the updated 2026 framework presented by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The study demonstrates that FOIP has progressively evolved from a diplomatic vision centred on openness, connectivity and the rule of law into a broader strategic framework incorporating economic security, resilient supply chains and increasingly concrete forms of defence and security cooperation. The article begins by correctly situating FOIP within the wider transformation of the Indo-Pacific strategic environment. Economic dynamism coexists with territorial disputes, maritime tensions and growing military capabilities. Japan’s response has been to articulate a vision based upon a free and open regional order in which the rule of law, freedom of navigation, peaceful settlement of disputes and connectivity remain fundamental principles. These elements have provided continuity even as the instruments through which Tokyo seeks to defend them have changed considerably. One of the article’s principal strengths lies in tracing the intellectual origins of FOIP beyond its formal launch in 2016. Cisneros Cristóbal recalls Shinzo Abe’s 2007 “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech before the Indian Parliament, in which the Indian and Pacific Oceans were already conceived as an increasingly interconnected strategic, political and economic space. This earlier formulation is important because it demonstrates that the Indo-Pacific idea was not originally conceived simply as a response to China, but as a broader vision of maritime interdependence connecting Asia, Africa and the principal commercial routes linking both oceans. The formal articulation of FOIP in 2016 marked a significant step in Japanese foreign policy. The Nairobi TICAD VI conference provided the setting in which Tokyo began explicitly promoting the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, linking Asian and African prosperity through secure maritime routes and political stability. Particularly important is the article’s emphasis on Japan’s economic dependence upon the stability of these maritime spaces. The Indo-Pacific is not merely a strategic abstraction for Tokyo: it contains the sea lanes through which essential trade and energy flows sustain the Japanese economy. Cisneros Cristóbal also effectively identifies the flexibility of FOIP as one of its defining characteristics. It is neither an international organisation nor a closed regional institution. Japan has deliberately maintained it as an adaptable vision capable of accommodating States with different political systems and strategic preferences. This flexibility has facilitated the international diffusion of the Indo-Pacific concept to the United States, Australia, India and several European countries while allowing Tokyo to resist portraying FOIP exclusively as an anti-Chinese containment mechanism. The article’s treatment of the 2023 Kishida revision provides an important intermediary stage. By that point, the international context had changed markedly. United States-China competition had intensified, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had highlighted the fragility of the international order, supply-chain disruptions had become strategic concerns, and cyber, technological and economic vulnerabilities had acquired greater salience. The four pillars identified by Kishida therefore broadened FOIP beyond maritime openness towards multidimensional connectivity, economic resilience and a wider conception of security. This evolution becomes even clearer in the 2026 update. Cisneros Cristóbal shows how the new framework presented in Hanoi reorganises FOIP around three priority areas: economic infrastructure and supply-chain resilience, jointly created opportunities for growth and shared rules, and intensified security cooperation. This triad reflects the growing interdependence of economics and security within Japanese strategy. Semiconductors, critical minerals, energy supplies, digital infrastructure and logistical chains are no longer treated merely as commercial matters but as strategic assets whose availability and protection directly affect national and regional security. The article’s discussion of economic security is particularly valuable. Japan’s concern with excessive dependence upon specific suppliers or technologies reflects a wider global movement towards strategic diversification and resilience. Cisneros Cristóbal correctly situates this within FOIP rather than treating it as a separate policy field. Economic security has become one of the mechanisms through which Japan seeks to shape the regional order. The most important transformation, however, concerns the security dimension. Freedom of navigation, international law and peaceful dispute settlement were present from the beginning, but Tokyo has gradually added more operational instruments to support those principles. Joint exercises, maritime surveillance cooperation, agreements facilitating military activities and security assistance to partner States demonstrate that FOIP increasingly possesses a practical strategic component. The article is especially strong in its treatment of Japan’s expanding network of security partnerships. Alongside its longstanding alliance with the United States, Tokyo has strengthened cooperation with Australia, the United Kingdom, the Philippines and several Southeast Asian and Pacific States. This networked architecture is significant because it differs from a traditional alliance system. Japan is not constructing a single multilateral defence organisation; instead, it is developing overlapping bilateral and minilateral mechanisms that collectively enhance regional interoperability and strategic connectivity. Official Security Assistance (OSA) is one of the clearest examples of this transformation. Created in 2023, OSA enables Japan to provide equipment and infrastructure directly to the armed forces and other security institutions of partner States, distinguishing it from traditional development assistance. The programmes identified by Cisneros Cristóbal—including patrol craft, coastal radar, maritime surveillance systems and search-and-rescue capabilities—show a consistent emphasis on maritime security and capacity-building. This instrument is strategically significant because it demonstrates how Japan’s external assistance policy is adapting to a more contested security environment. Tokyo no longer limits itself to economic development and civilian cooperation; it increasingly supports the defence and security capacities of partner States whose geographical position contributes to the maintenance of a favourable regional balance. The analysis of Reciprocal Access Agreements further reinforces this argument. These agreements facilitate the temporary presence of armed forces, joint exercises, logistical exchanges and other cooperative activities by establishing predictable legal and administrative frameworks. Their importance lies precisely in reducing the friction that would otherwise accompany case-by-case military cooperation. The Australia-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement is correctly presented as the foundational example. Its entry into force provided a durable framework for cooperation between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Force. The subsequent agreement with the United Kingdom broadened this model beyond Japan’s immediate regional partners, while the agreement with the Philippines demonstrates the growing strategic importance of Southeast Asia within Japanese security planning. The Philippines case is particularly important. The 2025 entry into force of the Japan-Philippines RAA, followed by the 2026 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, strengthens interoperability, logistical support and the capacity to conduct exercises and humanitarian activities. Given the Philippines’ location along key maritime routes and its proximity to areas of strategic tension, this partnership constitutes one of the clearest manifestations of Japan’s more active Indo-Pacific posture. One of the article’s most convincing conclusions is that FOIP has not become a military alliance. Its open, flexible and non-institutionalised nature remains intact. Yet this does not mean that the strategy remains purely declaratory. On the contrary, the network of security agreements, assistance instruments, joint exercises and operational arrangements gives increasingly tangible content to principles that were initially expressed primarily through diplomatic language. This distinction is analytically important. FOIP’s strength lies partly in its capacity to remain politically inclusive while progressively acquiring strategic substance. Japan can therefore promote rule-based regional order without formally transforming FOIP into a bloc structure. This flexibility may help Tokyo cooperate with States that are unwilling to participate in an explicitly anti-Chinese coalition but nevertheless share concerns about maritime security, economic resilience and freedom of navigation. The article also captures the connection between European and Indo-Pacific security. Japan’s reciprocal access agreement with the United Kingdom and broader cooperation with European partners indicate that Tokyo increasingly views regional security as part of a wider global network. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced
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