We present a novel approach for applying Large Language Models (LLMs) to threat assessment in the context of foreign peacekeeping missions. Building on the PINPOINT project and its use case, the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, we combine an interdisciplinary risk-model with OSINT-based media collection and LLM-supported threat extraction. The proposed workflow maps media contents to mission-relevant threats, extracts structured information and applies several additional LLM-based processing steps to improve relevance and grounding. An evaluation of threats extracted from media documents shows high agreement between automatically generated results and human judgment for core aspects such as threat and mission relevance. These results indicate that LLMs provide a promising approach to support analysts in the context of peacekeeping missions.
This paper presents ContractHIL-HLS, a contract-aligned multi-agent workflow for practical high-level synthesis (HLS) engineering. The workflow makes three contributions. First, it introduces a structured contract as the semantic-alignment and task-execution artifact that transla…
While automated content-moderation systems have become essential for screening harmful content at scale, conventional task-specific classifiers often provide limited policy cov- erage and contextual understanding. Recently, commercial multimodal moderation APIs built on large fou…
We address the challenge of securely and efficiently outsourcing AI computations from a trusted but computationally weak client to an untrusted but powerful server, in the setting where the client holds both the input and the model, and the server must learn neither. We present M…
Automated vulnerability repair aims to reduce the time and effort required to patch security flaws from a vulnerability triage report. Recent agentic AI approaches have shown promising results in automated program repair. However, vulnerability repair demands richer program conte…
Long-term memory lets large language model(LLM) agents reuse prior preferences and work flows, but it also turns untrusted observations into persistent action context. We identify memory provenance laundering: during LLM-based memory consolidation, an external observation may be…
Agent security is widely treated as a question about action content. Defenses ask whether an instruction looks malicious. Benchmarks ask whether an agent performs a harmful sounding action. \textbf{We argue that agent security is fundamentally a contextual problem, and that the c…