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arxivcs.CRcs.AI2026-07-10

Blockchain-Linked Auditable Decision Management for Telecom/IoT Fraud-Control Requests

Saviz Changizi, Nasibeh Mohammadzadeh, Mohammad Shojafar, Rahim Tafazolli

Telecom fraud-control studies often stop at detector-level classification, but deployment use requires request-level policy resolution, lifecycle traceability, and auditability. This paper reframes fraud control as blockchain-linked auditable decision management for synthetic telecom/IoT fraud-control requests, and its main result is that the QLoRA-tuned LLM branch becomes much more usable than zero-shot prompting but mainly approaches, rather than outperforms, a lower-cost centralized ensemble. The framework maps each synthetic deployment record to a managed request, blocks explicit out-of-boundary cases through a deterministic hard-fraud gate, scores non-hard requests using centralized ML (M1), federated meta-learning (M2), or LLM-family risk sources (M3), and resolves actions through a shared five-state policy, two-zone refinement mechanism, and local Ethereum-compatible audit layer. Evaluation uses separate synthetic training data and a 100,000-record deployment replay corpus, so the study should be read as controlled drift-replay evidence rather than field validation or proof of live deployability. On validation, M1 gives the strongest balance, with legitimate-request FPR 0.0890 under the 0.10 operating cap and soft-fraud recall 0.8341. On labeled deployment replay, however, the legitimate-FPR gap becomes large: M1 rises to 0.1646 and M3-QLoRA to 0.1801, while M3-QLoRA reduces the M3-Base legitimate FPR from 0.3915 and reaches 0.8240 soft-fraud recall. Blockchain telemetry shows that lifecycle gas, cost, latency, and throughput differences are driven by submitted off-chain decision profiles rather than changes in fraud logic.

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