Multimodal Reward Hacking in Reinforcement Learning

Jiayu Yao, Yiwei Wang, Anmeng Zhang, Zhe Sun, Songsong Wang, Lingrui Mei, Yuyao Ge, Shenghua Liu

Reinforcement learning (RL) is increasingly used to align multimodal large language models (MLLMs), but higher rewards do not always imply better task performance. This risk is amplified when visual evidence is evaluated by text-only or weakly grounded rewards. We study reward hacking in MLLM RL across safety VQA, chart VQA, and stress-test settings, varying reward design, data ambiguity, model scale (2B-32B), and RL algorithm (GRPO, RLOO, DAPO). We introduce Newly Rewarded Failure Rate (NRFR), which measures failures among samples whose proxy reward improves over the SFT baseline. Outcome-only rewards cause severe hacking, reaching 48.1% Reward Hacking Rate (RHR), while NRFR exceeding RHR shows that RL creates new failures rather than merely inheriting them. Scaling reduces but does not eliminate hacking: even the 32B model retains a 54.9% worse rate under outcome-only rewards, whereas answer-aware rewards improve the oracle trend at every scale. Robustness is also algorithm- and scale-dependent: GRPO is consistently most resistant, RLOO remains vulnerable, and DAPO improves substantially from 2B to 8B. Visual-evidence rewards help only with reliable verification: keyword-based checks increase hacking, while VLM-as-judge semantic verification reduces it. Overall, multimodal reward hacking is a systematic result of optimizing imperfect rewards, and robust alignment requires rewards and verifiers that remain reliable under optimization pressure.